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When idols look into the future: Fair treatment
modulates the affective forecasting error in talent
show candidates
Marjolein Feys* and Frederik Anseel
Ghent University, Gent, Belgium
People’s affective forecasts are often inaccurate because they tend to overestimate
how they will feel after an event. As life decisions are often based on affective
forecasts, it is crucial to find ways to manage forecasting errors. We examined the
impact of a fair treatment on forecasting errors in candidates in a Belgian reality TV
talent show. We found that perceptions of fair treatment increased the forecasting
error for losers (a negative audition decision) but decreased it for winners (a positive
audition decision). For winners, this effect was even more pronounced when
candidates were highly invested in their self-view as a future pop idol whereas for
losers, the effect was more pronounced when importance was low. The results in this
study point to a potential paradox between maximizing happiness and decreasing
forecasting errors. A fair treatment increased the forecasting error for losers, but
actually made them happier.
Well, Paula… I’m speechless, I don’t knowwhat to say… Andwell…that’s not a great thing.
(Paula Abdul)
What was that?! That was terrible! (Randy Jackson)
I don’t think any artist on earth could singwith thatmuchmetal in theirmouth anyway…
it’s like a bridge. (Simon Cowell)
In January 2006, Paula Goodspeed participated in an audition of the TV show
American Idol. As reflected in their harsh comments, the judges were not impressed
and sent her home empty-handed. Two years later, the young woman was found dead
in her car outside the home of Paula Abdul, one of the judges in American Idol.
When investigating the case, the spotlight fell on her audition 2 years earlier. After the
footage was aired, Goodspeed wrote on her blog that she was finding it difficult to
cope with the ‘haters’ who mocked her. Goodspeed’s family said she was confident
and had high hopes when entering the competition, but was heartbroken at such a
brutal rejection. This incident started the discussion regarding media’s responsibility
in talent show formats, where aspiring candidates are confronted with harsh
comments.
*Correspondence should be addressed to Marjolein Feys, Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Gent, Belgium (email: marjolein.
feys@ugent.be).
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Affective forecasting
TheGoodspeed case illustrates how affective reactions to life eventsmay be influenced by
expectations and characteristics of the situation. In the past decade, a substantial body of
research has dealt with the question of how and how well people predict their affective
reactions to future events. Research has shown that people are not good at predicting
their emotions correctly (for reviews, see Gilbert, Driver-Linn, &Wilson, 2002; Wilson &
Gilbert, 2003). People expect to feel worse after negative events and better after positive
events than they actually end up feeling (e.g., Gilbert, Morewedge, Risen, & Wilson,
2004). For instance, Gilbert, Pinel,Wilson, Blumberg, andWheatley (1998) demonstrated
this tendency in six experimental studies in which participants overestimated the
duration of their affective reactions across a wide range of life events (i.e., the dissolution
of a romantic relationship, the failure of achieving tenure, an electoral defeat, negative
personality feedback, an account of a child’s death, and rejection by a prospective
employer). All six studies confirmed the basic forecasting error and showed an
overestimation of emotions after different events. In Study 2 for example, assistant
professors were asked to predict how happy they would feel after achieving tenure, and
howunhappy theywould feel after failing to achieve tenure. Results showed that ‘positive
experiencers’ (assistant professorswho achieved tenure)were not as happy as forecasters
believed they would be. In addition, recent ‘negative experiencers’ (assistant professors
who failed to achieve tenure)werehappier than forecasters estimated theywould be. This
forecasting errormay be a detrimental factor in people’s daily lives because itmay prompt
individuals to pursue the wrong goals (Greitemeyer, 2009), or make the wrong decisions
about important life choices (Buehler & McFarland, 2001). If one is convinced that the
only way to be truly happy is quitting one’s job and moving to the South of France, the
eventual outcome may actually be rather disappointing and have far-reaching unforeseen
personal implications.
Because of the importance of accurate forecasts, it is crucial to gain insight into the
different situations that lead the forecasting error to increase or decrease, and ultimately
find ways to manage this error. As Wilson and Gilbert (2005) stated: Finding ways to
increase the accuracy of affective forecasts is a worthy enterprise – though not, we
suspect, a particularly easy one (p. 134). To date, the studies that have answered this call
have mostly focused on individual differences (e.g., mood orientation, Buehler,
McFarland, Spyropoulos, & Lam, 2007; Big Five personality variables, Hoerger & Quirk,
2010; anxious attachment, Tomlinson, Carmichael, Reis, & Aron, 2010) and to a lesser
extent on situational aspects that influence the affective forecasting error (e.g., self-
presentation, Dunn, Biesanz, Human, & Finn, 2007; temporal location, Gilbert, Gill, &
Wilson, 2002; effect of learning, Wilson, Meyers, & Gilbert, 2001).
Although profiling the type of individuals that typically make more or less
forecasting errors clearly is important, such knowledge offers few opportunities to
actively manage this error by external parties. To find ways to influence the forecasting
error, it is crucial to more systematically identify situational conditions under which
the error increases or decreases. Such knowledge may enable policy makers to actively
alter situational characteristics of important life events (e.g., important career moves,
election decisions) to minimize forecasting errors. Although a few studies have
investigated situational aspects that may influence the forecasting error, to our
knowledge only one study has looked at fairness aspects of the event itself. In the sixth
study of their paper (‘Failure, Inc.’), Gilbert et al. (1998) used a student sample to
examine individuals’ reactions to being rejected or selected by a prospective employer.
In this laboratory study, some participants believed that the hiring decision would be
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made by a single individual on the basis of little relevant information (unfair decision),
and others believed that the decision would be made by a group of individuals on the
basis of ample relevant information (fair decision). Participants estimated how they
would feel after being told that they had and had not been chosen for the job. After
this, all participants were told that they had not been chosen, and they reported their
feelings. The authors found that the group of participants in the ‘unfair procedure’
condition predicted to feel equally bad as the group of participants in the ‘fair
procedure’ condition. However, contrary to their predictions, participants who were
rejected based on an unfair procedure reported feeling happier than expected, and
were happier than participants who were rejected based on a fair procedure.
Presumably, an unfair basis of the decision gave people a handy excuse for the
unfavourable outcome, whereas the fair process forced people to consider that they
were more deserving of the unfavourable outcome. Apparently, participants did not
realize how the basis of the decision would influence their affective reaction to it, but
contrary to their anticipation, in this type of hiring decisions the fairness of the event
seems to play a role in how accurate affective forecasts are.
In this study, we build on these insights and extend affective forecasting research by
examining how individuals actually experienced the fairness of the event. Building on
Gilbert et al. (1998), it can be expected that when anticipating the decision and
construing their future affective states, individuals have trouble in taking the fairness of
the decision into account. However, it is unclear what happens to their subsequent actual
affective reaction when they unexpectedly experience a fair versus unfair treatment.
Thus, in a natural field settingwe first test how the experience of a fair or unfair treatment
influences individuals’ actual happiness (and hence leads to larger or smaller forecasting
errors). Next, to further increase our understanding of the role of experienced fairness in
affective forecasts, we also examined an additional moderator, namely the investment
participants have in the life domain being evaluated. It is our expectation that fairness
should play a stronger role when the participants are highly invested in the self-views that
come into play.
To examine potential modulating effects on the forecasting error, it is necessary to
first replicate the forecasting error in its basic form in this new field setting, namely
during auditions for the TV talent show Idool (Belgian version of American Idol). For
reasons of brevity, we will refer to candidates that are rejected during the first round of
Idols auditions as ‘losers’ and those that may proceed to the next round of auditions as
‘winners’. It should be noted that the new and unique setting of this study implies a
particular robust and ecologically valid test of the forecasting error. Forecasting
researchers have often chosen to examine anticipated emotions only (e.g., Sevdalis &
Harvey, 2009), have focused on negative or positive events rather than both (e.g.,
Gilbert et al., 1998; Keller & Bless, 2009) or relied upon a between-group design. In
these studies, different samples of participants, often students, are asked to rate either
their anticipated or experienced reactions to an event, often in laboratory settings (e.g.,
Fernandez-Duque & Landers, 2008). In this field study, however, we investigated both
anticipated and actual emotional reactions to a high-stakes career decision over time in
the same group of candidates. In line with previous forecasting error research, we
expect the following:
Hypothesis 1: Winners will overestimate how good they will feel (H1a) and losers will
overestimate how bad they will feel (H1b).
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Fair treatment
A rich body of social psychological research suggests that reactions to negative eventsmay
be caused by the threat this poses to people’s assumptions about the controllability, and
fairness of their worlds. Probably one of the earliest and best known renditions of this
psychological principle is Lerner’s (1980) articulation of his ‘just-world’ theory (for more
recent variants of this theory, see for instance Callan, Dawtry, & Olson, 2012; Callan,
Ellard, & Nicol, 2006; Otto, Glaser, & Dalbert, 2009). These theoretical perspectives
predict that people have a deep-seated psychological need to believe that the world is a
fair place, in which individuals get what they deserve (Sutton & Winnard, 2007). As a
result, people form separate representations of ‘the world of the victim’ where unjust
things happen to others, versus the ‘world of the self’ in which justice prevails (see also
Hafer, 2002). Hence, when thinking about what will or may happen in one’s own future,
individuals are generally convinced that they will be treated fairly and that they will
receive the outcomes they deserve, leading them to construe their own mental life in
function of this.
However, one of the implications of this line of research that remains underexplored
but is central to affective forecasting theory, is that the representations people make of
future events are often wrong, and that an actual event may be different and less fair from
whatwas previously anticipated. Research indeed suggests that when people think about
an event, they often fail to consider the possibility that their particular, momentary
conceptualization of the event is only one of many ways in which they might have
conceptualized it and that the event they are imagining may thus be quite different from
the event that actually comes to pass (e.g., Gilbert et al., 1998; Griffin, Dunning, & Ross,
1990; Griffin & Ross, 1991). This phenomenon, termed ‘misconstrual’, was proposed as
one of the primary causes of why people are so unsuccessful in making accurate
predictions about their future emotions (e.g., Gilbert et al., 1998). Moreover, misconstru-
ing an event and the forecasting inaccuracy that follows from it is most likely to occur
when the event has never been experienced before (Gilbert et al., 1998). Hence, when
forecasters misconstrue an event they typically conceive it as more impactful on their
emotions than it actually turns out to be, leading them to overestimate their affective
responses (e.g., Gilbert et al., 1998).
In the current setting, the typical construal for candidates will involve the expectation
that theywill be treated fairly. Individuals typically have inflated positive self-views (Alicke
& Sedikides, 2009). In the case of Idols candidates, we believe that the positivity of their
self-concept as singers will be even more elevated given their interest in participating in a
talent show. Given their positive self-views in this life domain, an expected fair treatment
should result in the recognition of their talent. Thus, the default anticipation will be to be
chosen as oneof the ‘winners’ in the first roundon thebasis of fair procedures. Thus,when
candidates are required to anticipate a positive decision (i.e., they stay in the competition),
they will consider fair treatment as the default reason for their future success in the
competition. After all, they see themselves as potential future idols. This anticipation of a
bright future is expected to lead them to predicted high levels of future happiness.
However, when the actual audition takes place, candidates may experience lower
fairness than imagined, leading to less positive emotions than predicted, thus a greater
discrepancy between the predicted and actual happiness (i.e., a larger forecasting error).
Conversely, when candidates feel that they are treated fairly during the audition, this will
lead to an increase in positive feelings for winners, attaining a level closer than what was
initially anticipated (i.e., a smaller forecasting error). Thus, the forecasting inaccuracy for
winners will decrease due to fair treatment.
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When candidates have to consider the possibility of failure (i.e., a negative decision),
they will construe the anticipated event as one wherein they are treated unfairly. They
started off with anticipating recognition of their talent but the prospect of a harsh
rejection will lead them to attribute this to faulty procedures. Thus, given their positive
self-concept as a singer, unfair treatment is the most likely reason for their failure.
However,when the event takesplace, and candidates feel they are treated fairly during the
audition, even when they lose, this will lead to unanticipated positive feelings regarding
the event and a greater discrepancy between the predicted and actual happiness (i.e.,
a larger forecasting error). Conversely, when losers have the feeling that they are treated
unfairly during the audition, this will lead to the expected negative feelings, attaining a
level closer than what was initially anticipated (i.e., a smaller forecasting error). Thus, the
forecasting inaccuracy for losers will increase due to fair treatment. An example of how
fair treatment and importancemay influence actual happiness (and hence, the forecasting
error) is provided in Table 1. In sum, we expect that:
Hypothesis 2: Fair treatment will lead to the experience of an affect score closer to the
forecasted affect score forwinners (H2a) and further from the forecasted
affect score for losers (H2b).
Importance of self-view
Recently, researchers have proposed that fairness concerns become particularly salient
when central aspects of the self are under threat (e.g., De Cremer & Tyler, 2005). In their
self-activationmodel of social justice, van den Bos, Miedema, Vermunt, and Zwenk (2011)
propose that situations that posit a potential threat for the self are most likely to direct
attention to fairness issues. For instance, Johnson, Selenta, and Lord (2006) found that
when people’s relational self-concepts were triggered, they placedmore emphasis on the
interpersonal treatment, and were more sensitive to (un)fair events. On the basis of these
theoretical perspectives, we expect that the effects of treatment on the affective
forecasting errorwill bemore pronounced as candidates aremoreheavily invested in their
self-view as a singer. In line with previous research in the self-concept literature, we
conceptualize a high level of self-investment as the importance individuals attach to their
focal self-view. Self-views that are strongly linked to individuals’ goals and values, those
that they identify as more personally important, are self-views that strongly influence
candidates’ global sense of self-worth. More than a century ago, James (1890) already
Table 1. Example of change in affective forecasting error due to treatment and importance
Winners Losers
Affective forecasting
error (AFE)
Hypothesis 1a
Prediction of happiness: +4
Actual happiness: +2
? Absolute value AFE = 2
Hypothesis 1a
Prediction of happiness: 4
Actual happiness: 2
? Absolute value AFE = 2
Fair treatment Hypothesis 2a
Actual happiness: +3
? Absolute value AFE = 1 (↓ AFE)
Hypothesis 2b
Actual happiness: 0
? Absolute value AFE = 4 (↑ AFE)
High importance Actual happiness: +4
? Absolute value AFE = 0 (↓↓ AFE)
Actual happiness: 1
? Absolute value AFE = 5 (↑↑ AFE)
Low importance Actual happiness: +2
? Absolute value AFE = 2 (= AFE)
Actual happiness: 2
? Absolute value AFE = 2 (↑ AFE)
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suggested that abilities on which people have ‘staked their salvation’ should contribute
significantly to self-esteem, whereas those to which people are less committed should
have little impact on their self-worth. Indeed, individuals have been found to seek most
feedback on those self-views they aremost invested in (Anseel& Lievens, 2007).Given the
centrality of highly invested self-views for the candidates’ general self-worth, talent show
auditions should create a particular sensitive study context for effects of treatment as
candidates anticipate an evaluation of the focal self-view as a future artist. In this setting, a
high self-investment in their artistic self-view should therefore lead to an increased focus
on threats to the self when anticipating the competition, and thus a higher attention to
fairness issues.
Hence, we expect that the importance candidates place on succeeding in this audition
will influence the relation between fair treatment and the affective forecasting error.
More specifically, for winners we expect that when they are treated fairly, they will feel
even closer to the happiness level they predicted, when they attach greater importance to
succeeding in the audition. For these candidates, succeeding is very important making
themmore sensitive to just treatment and justice breaches. Experiencing a fair treatment
and their heightened attention for it should make the ‘winning’ situation even more
similar to their construal, and hence lead to a smaller forecasting error. On the other hand,
candidates who find succeeding less important, will be relatively less sensitive to fairness
issues. Hence, although these candidates will also feel better due to fair treatment, this
increase in positive feelings will not be as high, leading to a smaller decrease in the
forecasting inaccuracy. Thus, for winners we expect the actual happiness score to be
closer to what was expected (i.e., a smaller forecasting error) due to fair treatment, and
this effect will be more pronounced when importance is high.
For losers, we expect that when they are treated fairly, they will feel less negative
than expected, and this will be even more so when they attach greater importance to
succeeding in the audition. These ‘high importance’ individuals will be especially
sensitive to just treatment or justice breaches, and hence will react more favourably
when treated fairly than individuals who attach low importance to succeeding. Thus,
when losers who attach great importance to succeeding are treated fairly, they will feel
happier (or less unhappy) than predicted, leading to a greater forecasting error.
Candidates who find succeeding less important will not be as sensitive to unfair
treatment. Thus, although these candidates will also feel better due to fair treatment,
this rise in positive feelings will not be as high, leading to a smaller increase in the
forecasting inaccuracy. Hence, for losers we expect the actual happiness score to be
further from what was expected (i.e., a larger forecasting error), and this effect will be
greater when importance is high.
Hence, in this study we expected candidates’ self-reported importance of their self-
view to moderate the relation between fair treatment and the forecasting inaccuracy.
More specifically, we propose the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 3a: For winners, fair treatment will lead to the experience of an affect score
closer to the forecasted affect score, and this effect will be more
pronounced when importance is high than when importance is low.
Hypothesis 3b: For losers, fair treatment will lead to the experience of an affect score
further from the forecasted affect score, and this effect will be more
pronounced when importance is high than when importance is low.
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Method
Participants and procedure
Participants were candidates in the reality television show Idool (Belgian version of the
renownedsingingcontest formatAmerican Idol). This talent showwasfirst aired asPop Idol
on British television in 2001. The format has turned into a true global phenomenon, airing
over 135 series (e.g.,American Idol, Arab Idol, Australian Idol, Idool) acrossmore than 40
territories, proving a track record of guaranteed success in every country where it has been
aired. In this study, in total 383 candidates participated (40.2% men, 59.8% women; mean
age = 20.5, SD = 3.2). Self-report data were collected on two points in time (T1 = distrib-
uted 1 week before the auditions; T2 = in between 2–6 days after the auditions).1
Measures
Affective forecasting (T1, T2)
On T1, participants were informed that they would receive a follow-up questionnaire
2 days after the audition. Participants were asked to predict how (un)happy they would
feel at that time if they received a positive decision and if they received a negative decision
on a scale from4 (very unhappy) to +4 (very happy). Two days after the audition (T2),
participants received the follow-up questionnaire and were asked to indicate how happy
they felt that time using the same response scale.
Importance (T1)
Importance was measured with three items that assessed the importance the candidates
placed on their self-views as a singer and on succeeding in the audition. The three items
are: It is important to me as a person to performwell on this audition, I will domy best
during the audition and I will try as hard as I can to perform as best as I can during this
audition. Responses were made on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly
agree; a = .87).
Treatment (T2)
Treatmentwas assessedwith four items targeting participants’ perceptions of the fairness
of treatment (Bauer et al., 2001). Items were: The judges treated the candidates with
respect during the audition, I was satisfiedwithmy treatment during the audition, The
judges were considerate during the audition, and I was treated politely and fairly
during the audition. Responses were made on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5
(strongly agree; a = .81).
Results
Perception checks
Toexaminewhether participants’ perceptions of treatment reflected the actual fairness of
the treatment as coded by two objective, independent raters, we conducted perception
1 The measures reported in this study were part of a larger data collection effort focusing on a diverse set of motivational and
attitudinal variables, both qualitative and quantitative,measured at different points in time. These additional data and results from
additional analyses can be obtained from the authors upon request.
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checks for this variable. Raters used a rating scale from 1 (Disrespectful treatment) to 3
(Respectful treatment) to code the unedited video material of the auditions for how the
judges actually treated the candidate during their audition. Both raters rated all of the
available footage. Coding rules were as follows: Code this audition as 1 if the judges
express their comments to the candidate in a disrespectful and humiliating manner,
Code this audition as 2 if the judges express their comments to the candidate in a
neutral manner and Code this audition as 3 if the judges express their comments to the
candidate in a respectful and considerate manner. More detailed coding rules and
examples for each of the three possible responses (i.e., 1, 2, 3) were provided for the
raters. Inter-rater agreement for this variable was .73. Furthermore, the correlation
between the perception of treatment and the actual treatment was .47 (p = .00). These
results show that candidates’ perceptions corresponded with the assessment of the
situation by two raters and thus their fairness perceptionswere in linewithhow theywere
treated by the judges in reality.
Hypotheses 1a and 1b
Descriptive statistics and correlations for the total group and for winners and losers
separately are presented in Table 2. Note that this table also provides information on the
eventuality that did not occur, namely winners’ predictions of losing and losers’
predictions ofwinning. First, as can be seen in Table 3 and Figure 1, a paired sample t-test
revealed that winners were significantly unhappier than they had expected to be,
t = 3.61, p = .00 and that losers were significantly happier than they had expected to be,
t = 12.09, p = .00. Thus, Hypotheses 1a and 1b were supported, replicating the basic
forecasting error.
Hypotheses 2a and 2b
To create an index of forecasting (in)accuracy,we first calculated the absolute value of the
difference between each candidate’s affective forecast and experience (│Predicted
happiness T1 –Actual happiness T2│). As the outcomes are absolute values, higher values
indicate a higher degree of inaccuracy between predicted and actual happiness. This
measure was used because we were primarily interested in the size rather than the
direction of errors in affective forecasts, an approach that is in linewith previous research
into moderators of the affective forecasting error (e.g., Dunn, Brackett, Ashton-James,
Schneiderman, & Salovey, 2007).More detailed resultswithout absolute difference scores
are available from the authors.
Next, to test Hypotheses 2a and 2b, we conducted hierarchical regression analyses to
seewhether treatment influenced the degree of inaccuracy. As predicted, treatment had a
significant decreasing effect for winners, ΔR2 = .16, F(1, 69) = 12.99, p = .00;
b = 0.55, p = .00, and a significant increasing effect on the degree of inaccuracy for
losers, ΔR2 = .04, F(1, 175) = 8.06, p = .01; b = 0.31, p = .01.2 Hence, Hypotheses 2a
and 2b are supported.
To further determine if the pattern of the interaction for loserswas consistentwith our
hypotheses,weplotted the interaction in Figure 2. Standardized coefficients of the simple
2Note that including gender, age, and emotional stability as control variables in these and the following regression analyses had no
impact on the findings.
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slopes were calculated by using themacros developed by O’Connor (1998). Standardized
coefficients of both simple slopes were significantly different from 0 (b = 0.41, p = .01
for winners and b = 0.23, p < .00 for losers). As can be seen from Figure 2, the pattern of
the interaction for winners and losers was as predicted: the forecasting inaccuracy for
Figure 2. Size of affective forecasting error for fair and unfair treatment for winners (H2a) and losers
(H2b). Note. Fair and unfair treatment was calculated by performing a median split on this variable.
Table 3. Means and standard deviations on affective forecasts and actual happiness of participants (H1a
and H1b)
Happiness
Forecast (T1),
M (SD)
Actual (T2),
M (SD) Difference T
Winners 3.62 (0.91) 2.99 (1.29) 3.61**
Losers 1.77 (1.52) 0.19 (2.15) 12.09***
Note. ***p < .001; **p < .01.
Figure 1. Affective forecasting error for winners (H1a) and losers (H1b).
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winners decreased due to fair treatment, whereas the forecasting error increased for
losers due to fair treatment. Hence, as evidenced by two types of forecasting analytical
methods, the results are in linewith our theoretical arguments, supporting Hypotheses 2a
and 2b.
Hypotheses 3a and 3b
Next, we conducted a regression analysis to see which predictors, including the
interaction term of treatment and importance, were statistically significant. Results are
shown in Table 4. As hypothesized, the interaction between treatment and importance
was statistically significant for winners: b = 0.74, p = .02; ΔR2 = .06, F(1, 67) = 5.32,
p = .02. Furthermore, the interaction was also significant for losers: b = 0.50, p = .01;
ΔR2 = .04, F(1, 173) = 6.82, p = .01.
To determine if the pattern of the interaction for losers was consistent with our
hypotheses, we plotted the interaction in Figures 3 and 4. Standardized coefficients of the
simple slopes were calculated by using the macros developed by O’Connor (1998). For
winners, the standardized coefficients of the simple slopes show that only the slope for
high importancewas significantly different from0 (b = 0.46, p = .00). The simple slope
for low importance was not significantly different from 0 (b = 0.15, p = .48). As can be
seen from Figure 3, the pattern of the interaction for winners was as predicted: the
forecasting inaccuracy decreased due to fair treatment, and this effect was most
pronounced for high importance individuals. Thus, Hypothesis 3a could be confirmed.
For losers (Figure 4), only the standardized coefficient of low importance was
significantly different from 0 (b = 0.34, p = .00). The simple slope for high importance
was not significantly different from 0 (b = 0.12, p = .22). As can be seen from Figure 4,
there is indeed an increase in the affective forecasting error for losers, but this is steeper
for low importance, and almost non-existent for high importance, which is contrary to
what we predicted. Hence, as we observed an increase in forecasting error only for losers
with low importance scores, Hypothesis 3b was not supported.
In an exploratory sense, we also tested whether treatment and importance interacted
in moderating the relationship between winning versus losing and the affective
forecasting error. Thus, we explored the three-way interaction between treatment,
importance, and ‘group’ (which consists of winning versus losing). We entered the two-
way and three-way interactions in steps 2 and 3. However, as can be seen in Table 5, the
Table 4. Summary of hierarchical regression analysis of treatment and importance on inaccuracy (H3a
and H3b)
Winners (N = 71) Losers (N = 176)
b SE(b) b t p ΔR2 b SE(b) b t p ΔR2
Step 1
Treatment 0.52 0.15 0.38 3.60 .00 .22*** 0.27 0.11 0.18 2.41 .02 .05**
Importance 0.72 0.52 0.44 1.39 .17 0.19 0.33 0.05 0.57 .57
Step 2
Treatment 9
Importance
0.74 0.32 0.72 2.31 .02 .06* 0.50 0.19 0.24 2.61 .01 .04*
Note. Regression coefficients are for the final step.
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
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three-way interaction among treatment, importance, and group was not significant,
ΔR2 = .00, F(1, 240) = .25, p = .62. Although this analysis confirms the general pattern of
results that was found in the analyses discussed earlier, the result of this three-way
interactionwas not significant. There can be several potential explanations for not finding
a significant result. One possible explanation, for instance, can be the unequal amount of
participants in the ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ group and a small number of participants in both
groups, making it statistically very difficult to find significant three-way interactions.
Figure 3. Interaction of treatment and importance on the affective forecasting error for winners (H3a).
Note. Fair and unfair treatment and high and low importance were calculated by performing amedian split
on the variables.
Figure 4. Interaction of treatment and importance on the affective forecasting error for losers (H3b).
Note. Fair and unfair treatment and high and low importance were calculated by performing amedian split
on the variables.
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Discussion
This study set out to inspire a new line of research on affective forecasting by
systematically focusing on situational factors that may enhance or hinder the accuracy of
the forecasts people make about their happiness after important life events. A better
understanding of how situations (and individuals’ perceptions of it) may alter individuals’
forecasts is theoretically important as it may bring new insights in how forecasts (i.e.,
construals) are formed. However, equally important, it will bring much needed evidence
to informpolicymakers how to develop interventions thatmay help people in influencing
forecasting errors.
We first replicated the basic premise of affective forecasting research in this new,
important field setting: In a talent show, losers felt less bad than they had expected, and
winners felt less good than they had expected. Themain focus of this studywas, however,
to examine how one aspect of the situation, that should be easily manageable to external
parties, may affect this forecasting error. Importantly, we found that the degree of
inaccuracy increased for losers and decreased for winners when the received treatment
was fair. The finding that outcome favourability interacts with fairness principles in
determining emotions is in line with studies showing that outcome favourability and
fairness aspects often interact to influence work outcomes such as employees’ work
attitudes and behaviours (e.g., Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996; Brockner et al., 2003;
Garonzik, Brockner, & Siegel, 2000). As a final step, we further explored whether this
situational influence of treatment had differential effects on talent show participants
depending on their investment in their self-view as an artist. This is important, as it would
imply that intervention or information strategies designed tomitigate affective forecasting
errors might be more appropriate for some individuals and might be customized to
specific participants. To this end, we tested the effect of the interaction between
treatment and self-view importance. Both regression analysis and repeated measures
analysis showed that the effect of the interaction on forecasting inaccuracy was
significant. For winners, as expected, we found that the forecasting inaccuracy decreased
due to fair treatment, and this effect was most pronounced when importance was high.
For losers, we found that the forecasting inaccuracy increased due to fair treatment, but
this was more pronounced for low importance, disconfirming our hypothesis. For high
Table 5. Summaryof hierarchical regression analysis of group, treatment, and importanceon inaccuracy
b SE(b) b t p ΔR2
Step 1
Group 0.98 0.32 0.24 3.08 .00 .16***
Treatment 0.10 0.09 0.07 1.06 .29
Importance 0.30 0.29 0.10 1.06 .29
Step 2
Group 9 Treatment 0.79 0.23 0.24 3.40 .00 .08***
Group 9 Importance 0.54 0.81 0.10 0.67 .51
Treatment 9 Importance 0.55 0.17 0.31 3.26 .00
Step 3
Group 9 Treatment 9 Importance 0.25 0.50 0.08 0.50 .62 .00
Note. Regression coefficients are for the final step.
***p < .001.
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importance, the increase in forecasting error was not significant. Of course, given the
complexity of our hypotheses and the fact that this study was conducted in one sample,
caution is needed when interpreting these results as it is currently unclear to what extent
the conclusions can be generalized to other settings (e.g., recruitment or career
orientation).
Theoretical and practical implications
The chief implication of this study is that a fair interpersonal treatment plays an important
role when making affective forecasts. Affective forecast errors consist of a discrepancy
between twocomponents, (1) the construed situation and (2) the experienceof the actual
situation. This study examined only natural variations in the second component, the
fairness experience of the actual situation, while the construed situation remained
unaffected. Thus, the size of the forecasting errors observed in this study reflects changes
in the second component and thus sheds new light on the type of construals that are
initially formed and what role fairness plays in these construals.
Conceptually, our findings indicate that the anticipation of a future affective state
involves the construal of an interpersonal fair situation. Thus, when people reflect on
future events, they expect to be treated fairly and this forms the basis of their predictions
of how they will feel. However, in the real world events often turn out not to be as just as
wewould like them to be. Thus, our conclusions imply that an important factor that lies at
the basis of misconstrual in affective forecasting is individuals’ implicit assumptions that
the world is a just place. This knowledgemay be crucial given the importance of affective
forecasting in guiding our decision-making (Kermer, Driver-Linn,Wilson, &Gilbert, 2006;
Mellers, 2000) and pursuing our goals (e.g., Greitemeyer, 2009). Being aware that
unrealistically positive or negative predictions may be caused by faulty fairness
expectations may help individuals to better manage their predictions and subsequently
make better decisions. Furthermore, knowing that the (un)fairness of an event may
impact the error and enhance people’s reactions may help policy makers (e.g.,
organizations hiring new employees or making tenure decisions, talent competitions)
to pay more attention to the treatment to minimize individuals’ forecasting errors.
However, because of the potential paradox this study has pointed to between
maximizing happiness and decreasing forecasting errors, this may be more complex
than it seems. Although it is generally proposed that we should seek to increase the
accuracy of forecasts, one should be careful in deciding on which of the two
components to focus, the initial construal or the actual experience. In this study, for
instance, a fair treatment actually increased the forecasting error for losers, but made
them happier. It will be evident that in practice, we would not recommend providing
people with an unfair treatment to decrease forecast errors, so as to make them as
unhappy as they originally predicted they would be. Instead, the challenge lies in
developing acceptable information strategies that help people in taking potential unfair
experiences into account when making forecasts or anticipating important events.
Moreover, it may be that forecasting errors are not always detrimental. Even if the
anticipated judgements are wrong, they may motivate people to behave in adaptive
ways. For example, an academic’s anticipation that getting tenure will contribute to his
or her happiness can be an important motivator to work hard towards the goal of
achieving this desired position.
In addition, we found that the importance of individuals’ self-views moderated
the relation between fair treatment and the forecasting error. Winners that were
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treated fairly and attached high importance to their self-view, felt almost as positive
as they had forecasted prior to the auditions. Thus, individuals who attached greater
importance to succeeding were indeed more sensitive to instances of fairness and to
fairness breaches, leading to more positive feelings when treated fairly, and more
negative feelings when treated unfairly. This finding is in line with the predictions of
the self-activation model of social justice (van den Bos et al., 2011). The more
importance individuals attach to their self-views, the more an evaluation of these
self-views may be threatening to their self-worth, leading them to pay more attention
to fairness issues. This implies that fairness plays a stronger role in anticipating
affective states when people are construing future events that are central than when
these are not central to their life. Thus, the support for the moderating role of
importance enhances our understanding of how construals are formed in affective
forecasting.
This finding bodes well for the viability of the self-activation model of social fairness
for explaining people’s fairness interpretations in different situations. However, before
integrating these previously unconnected research streams, we should pay attention to
the lack of support for Hypothesis 3b. With regard to the interactive effects for losers,
we found only an increase in the forecasting error for individuals who attached low
importance to their self-view as an artist. Losers who were treated fairly but found
succeeding not extremely important, felt less bad as they had forecasted prior to the
auditions. For these candidates, the combination of fair treatment and low importance
led to higher experienced happiness due to the fair treatment, leading to a situation
that was discrepant from their initial construal, and thus, increasing the forecasting
error. However, we found that when self-view importance was high, the forecasting
error was the same for candidates who were treated with respect, and candidates who
were treated disrespectfully. Thus, for losers, the treatment candidates receive makes
little difference for their happiness when the importance they attach to succeeding is
high.
A viable explanation is that, under conditions of extreme self-view investment,
candidates have such a high need to protect their ego that when they hear that they
‘lost’, they no longer pay attention to aspects of the environment such as informational
feedback or the way they are treated. In the case of unambiguous negative feedback,
paying attention to the fairness of treatment might be even more hurtful for the self as
one might be obliged to conclude that the treatment was actually reasonably fair and
come to the inescapable conclusion that the central self-view that is so strongly held, is
plain wrong. Therefore, from a self-enhancement perspective, it might be safer to ‘shut
off’ from the environment in case of failure and cognitively attribute the threat to the
self away. This would be in line with the main tenets of the mnemonic neglect model
(Sedikides & Green, 2004), which contends that people recall self-referent feedback
poorly when it carries negative implications for central self-aspects, because such
feedback is perceived as threatening. For instance, Sedikides and Green (2004) showed
that participants manifest such mnemonic neglect only when the central negative
feedback is highly diagnostic of self-aspects (high in threat potential), not when it is
low in diagnosticity (low in threat potential). Of course, as these explanations are
tentative, future research should examine whether further support can be found for
them. Our results suggest that predictions of the mnemonic neglect model and the self-
activation model of fairness should be reconciled in future research to make more
accurate predictions about affective forecasts in high-stakes settings.
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Limitations
Although the high-stakes setting and natural observation provided a high external validity,
the independent variables were not experimentally manipulated, participants were not
randomly assigned to the losers andwinners conditions, and all measures were self-report
(be it at different points in time),whichmay cause the internal validity of our findings to be
relatively low. Furthermore, itmay bepossible that factors such as personality, experience
with such competitions and talent contribute to both predictions and experience in non-
random ways. However, as previous forecasting research has relied extensively on
experimental laboratory studies, we believe there is a place formore correlational designs
to complement previous studies on moderators of the affective forecasting error. It is
clear, however, that the present findings should be re-examined with a design that
provides better guarantees for causal inferences.
Second, the within person design may have influenced our results. Future research
could address this by for instance including a control group that experiences but does not
predict emotions to rule out the potential influence of this design on the findings.
Third, although our results show that a fair treatment may influence the affective
forecasting error, caution is needed when interpreting the results. Because of the
inherent aspects of this study’s setting, candidates received the outcome decision
immediately after their audition. Hence, it is possible that candidates’ assessment of
how well they were treated (i.e., their perception of treatment) was influenced by the
decision that was communicated to them. However, the perception checks that were
conducted showed a fairly high agreement between candidates’ perceptions of
treatment and the actual treatment they received as coded by two independent raters,
indicating that their own assessment of treatment aligned with the actual treatment
they received. However, as noted before, future studies should try to replicate our
findings in a more controlled setting where the influence of other variables can be
ruled out. This way, it will be possible to establish actual situational effects on the
affective forecasting error.
Conclusion
In conclusion, this study shows that fair treatment and importance have the potential to
influence the degree of forecasting inaccuracy. Our findings suggest that both fairness
expectations and investment in the life domain play an important role in construing future
events in forecasts. This provides new insights towards finding ways to manage the
forecasting error. We encourage scholars to seek for other potential situational variables,
to actively manipulate them and explore the possibility of developing interventions and
information strategies for externally managing individuals’ natural tendency to overes-
timate how they will feel after important life events.
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